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JUDICIAL INTERVENTION IN PARLIAMENTARY AFFAIRS TO
PREVENT A COUP D’ÉTAT
RIVKA WEILL*
INTRODUCTION
The Yuli Edelstein decision of March 2020 was unprecedented for Israel
as well as in comparative terms.1 The Israeli Supreme Court not only
scheduled the date of a parliamentary vote for the first time but did so for the
vote on replacing the Israeli Parliament’s (Knesset) most senior office
holder—the Speaker, who controls the Knesset’s agenda.2
In the
parliamentary arena, timing determines outcome because transitory
coalitions constantly form to decide legislative agendas.3 Timing is even
more critical regarding the election of the Knesset Speaker because once a
Speaker is elected, they cannot be removed before the next general election
except for cause and with the support of seventy-five percent of Members of
the Knesset (“MKs”).4
The pace and magnitude of the unfolding drama were breathtaking. The
Court heard the political parties demanding the vote within the first business
day after the submission of their petition.5 Within the next twenty-four hours,
the Court charged the Speaker, Edelstein, with calling a plenum vote to

© 2021 Rivka Weill.
* Reichman University (formerly IDC). Thanks to the panel’s participants on Comparative
Political Process Theory: Democracy and Distrust at ICON-S Mundo for their helpful comments.
This Essay builds on my work: Rivka Weill, The Yuli Edelstein Decision and the History of the
Balance of Power Between the Knesset and the Government in Israel, 44 TEL AVIV U.L. REV. 322
(2021) (Hebrew). I discuss some of the ideas in Israel’s Unfolding Democratic Crisis—Recent
Constitutional Challenges and Rulings Explored, YOUTUBE (April 28, 2020),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=clPb7cDiTiY. I thank the Maryland Law Review editorial
team, and especially Carly Brody & Alyssa Radovanovich, for their outstanding work. Special
thanks are due to my daughter, Elisheva Feintuch, for her helpful comments and Sagiv Wachman
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on July 28, 2021.
1. HCJ 2144/20 Movement for Quality Gov’t in Israel v. Knesset Speaker, Nevo Legal
Database (Isr.) (Mar. 23, 2020) [hereinafter Edelstein Decision].
2. Id. at ¶ 15 (President Hayut).
3. See infra notes 86–96 and accompanying text.
4. Knesset Law, 5754–1994, § 8(a).
5. Issachar Zalmanovich, Blue and White Petitioned the High Court Against Edelstein: “He
Hijacked the Knesset, We Will Not Let This Happen,” JDN (Mar. 19, 2020, 6:41 PM),
https://www.jdn.co.il/news/1299401/.
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choose a new Speaker within forty-eight hours.6 Towards the expiration of
the deadline, Edelstein resigned without compliance.7 Never before had a
Knesset Speaker resigned in protest while refusing to uphold a court order.
While the Court’s President stated that the rule of law has never been so
gravely violated,8 Edelstein claimed that he “prevented a civil war.”9 Every
governmental branch viewed the other as damaging core democratic
principles and attempting a coup. The revolutionary nature of this clash
between the legislative and judicial branches bears great historical and
comparative significance and should be thoroughly scrutinized.
Many Israeli scholars praise the Edelstein decision for the Court’s
willingness to strengthen the legislature’s constitutional power in its
relationship with the executive within a parliamentary system. They argue
that the executive overtook control of the Knesset in recent years to such an
extent that judicial intervention is warranted.10
In a parliamentary system, voters elect their representatives to the
legislature. Parliamentary elections in turn indirectly determine the
executive’s composition because the ruling coalition is comprised of MKs
enjoying parliament’s support. The executive’s mandate stems from
parliament and is dependent on parliament’s continued confidence.
Parliament’s expression of non-confidence in the government leads to its
fall.11 Since only the Knesset is directly elected, and opposition parties are
represented only in the Knesset, it is of paramount constitutional importance
to protect the legislature’s constitutional power from executive
encroachment.12
This Essay argues that, contrary to many scholars’ analyses, the need to
strengthen the Knesset at the expense of the government in a parliamentary
system cannot justify the Edelstein ruling.13 If at all, the Edelstein ruling can
only be justified to guarantee an orderly transfer of power from one
6. Edelstein Decision, supra note 1, at ¶ 1, 15 (President Hayut).
7. See infra note 105 and accompanying text.
8. HCJ 2144/20 Movement for Quality Gov’t in Israel v. Knesset Speaker, ¶ 4 Nevo Legal
Database (Mar. 25, 2020) [hereinafter Contempt Decision].
9. Shirit Avitan Cohen, I Laid Under the Wheels, I Will Not Lead to a Civil War, MAKOR
RISHON (Mar. 26, 2020, 6:12 PM), https://www.makorrishon.co.il/news/215437/.
10. See, e.g., Ittai Bar-Siman-Tov, Covid-19 Meets Politics: The Novel Coronavirus as a Novel
Challenge for Legislatures, 8 THEORY & PRAC. LEGIS. 1, 38 (2020); AMICHAI COHEN, THE HIGH
COURT WARS; THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION AND THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION (2020),
https://www.idi.org.il/media/14968/supreme-court-wars.pdf.
See also Panel on Judicial
Intervention in Parliamentary Proceedings-the Edelstein Decision’s Anniversary, YouTube (April
11, 2021), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mn4cG1Vz53w.
11. See Rivka Weill, Constitutional Transitions: The Role of Lame Ducks and Caretakers, 2011
UTAH L. REV. 1087, 1097 (2011).
12. See generally Rivka Weill, The Living-Dead, 38 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 387 (2015).
13. See infra Parts III–IV.
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administration to the next.14 Further, this Essay shows that the law, the
Knesset’s practice, judicial precedents, and the Israeli system’s parliamentary
nature all supported Edelstein’s position in a manner that should have
prevented judicial intervention.15 Moreover, unbeknownst to the Court, the
petitioners enjoyed a majority to replace the Speaker but not to form a
government that enjoys the Knesset’s confidence. They sought to use the
Court to enable a political transfer of power that was otherwise impossible.16
I suggest that the Edelstein affair illustrates the potentially dangerous
implications of judicial intervention in parliamentary affairs: politicization of
Court rulings on the one hand and judicialization of politics on the other.17
In fact, this Essay is the first in the comparative field to argue that when
courts intervene in intra-parliamentary affairs, they should only use
declaratory relief. This could have prevented some of the bitter fallout from
the Edelstein affair. Courts should not grant injunctions while meddling with
intra-parliamentary procedures because disobeying these injunctions will
expose members of parliament (“MPs”) to contempt of court proceedings.
Such proceedings, in turn, deeply undermine MPs’ parliamentary privilege.18
I. THE POLITICAL CIRCUMSTANCES
The coronavirus (“COVID-19”) hit Israel at the height of a political
crisis. After two undecisive election campaigns in 2019, in which no MK
was able to form a government that would win the Knesset’s confidence, the
third election for the Twenty-Third Knesset took place on March 2, 2020.
The third election had designated polling stations arranged to accommodate
citizens in quarantine.19 Israel had neither previously held three general
elections in twelve months nor had a caretaker government in power for so
long.20
Caretaker governments are roughly the equivalent of lame duck
administrations in presidential systems. I define them as starting with the
Knesset’s dissolution or government’s resignation and until the swearing-in
of a new government after elections.21 On December 26, 2018, the Knesset
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

See infra Part IV.
See infra Parts III–IV.
See infra Parts V–VI.
See infra Part VI.
See infra Part VI.
OFER KENIG, COVID-19 AND THE 2021 ELECTIONS IN ISRAEL: CHALLENGES AND
OPPORTUNITIES 6 (Aug. 18, 2021), https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/covid-19-and-the-2021elections-in-israel-en.pdf.
20. Rivka Weill, The Yuli Edelstein Decision and the History of the Balance of Power Between
the Knesset and the Government in Israel, 44 TEL AVIV U. L. REV. 322, 337 (2021) (Isr.).
21. See Rivka Weill, Judicial Review of Constitutional Transitions: War and Peace and Other
Sundry Matters, 45 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1381, 1395 (2012).
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decided to dissolve and by the time of the Edelstein decision, the caretaker
government served for 454 days.22 Israeli caretaker governments suffer from
democratic deficit since they typically lost the Knesset’s confidence and
serve on a temporary basis to avoid a vacuum in governance. They further
exhibit agency problems and may embark on risky adventures to either affect
election results or leave a legacy.23 Since 2003, the average duration of
Israeli caretaker governments has been approximately 160 days.24
I attribute the frequency and lengthy duration of caretaker governments
to Israel’s parliamentary system with a proportional representation (PR)
election method. Under the PR election system, each political party is
represented in the legislature roughly according to its share of electorate
support. To form a government, political parties must form a coalition that
enjoys the Knesset’s support. These combined features lead to weak and
unstable governments that depend on many coalition parties.25 Yet, even
against this background, the duration of the caretaker government governing
in 2020 was outstanding; it almost tripled the average. Many worried that a
brewing political crisis, coupled with the spread of COVID-19, could serve
as an excuse for violating democratic principles.26
In 2016, the Knesset amended Basic Law: The Knesset to provide that
the outgoing Speaker (assuming he would be re-elected as MK) continues to
fulfill his role on an interim basis until the election of a new Speaker.27
Edelstein thus served as the Knesset Speaker on a carry-over basis. The
Twenty-Third Knesset was sworn in on March 16, 2020, and President
Reuven Rivlin assigned the Blue and White party’s leader—Beni Ganz—the
task of forming a government, per the recommendation of sixty-one out of
one hundred and twenty MKs (“61 Bloc” or “Blue and White party’s
Bloc”).28

22. Law to dissolve the 20th Knesset, 5778–2018.
23. Weill, supra note 21, at 1393–97.
24. Weill, supra note 20, at 330 (supporting data in chart).
25. Weill, supra note 21, at 1385.
26. Pnina Sharvit Baruch & Ori Beeri, The Coronavirus Crisis in Israel: When an Epidemic
Meets a Political Crisis, INST. FOR NAT’L SEC. STUD. (Apr. 2, 2020),
https://www.inss.org.il/publication/coronavirus-and-law-1/; Carmit Padan, The Coronavirus Crisis
and the Opportunity for Social Transformation, INST. FOR NAT’L SEC. STUD. (Oct. 6, 2020),
https://www.inss.org.il/publication/coronavirus-and-social-solidarity/.
27. Basic Law: The Knesset, § 20 (Isr.). Before this amendment, the most veteran MK, who
held no ministerial role, would serve as acting Speaker until the election of a new Speaker.
28. Yehonatan Lis, Rivlin Met with Ganz and Netanyahu; the President Will Grant Tomorrow
the Mandate to the Chair of Blue and White, HAARETZ (Mar. 15, 2020),
https://www.haaretz.co.il/news/elections/1.8675677.
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Two days later, on March 18, Edelstein declared that he failed to form
an Arrangements Committee.29 This Committee is responsible to form all of
the Knesset’s standing committees, including a temporary committee that
oversees the use of emergency powers during the COVID-19 pandemic.30 As
COVID-19 spread, Edelstein ordered that no more than ten people shall be
simultaneously present in one space in the chamber or its committees.31 In
response, the Likud party’s Bloc, composed of fifty-eight MKs (“58 Bloc”),
demanded that each of the two blocs will be equally represented on the
Committee. Blue and White MKs countered that they should control a
majority of the regular composition of seventeen members. They claimed
that the Likud was cynically taking advantage of COVID-19 to prevent them
from exercising their parliamentary rights.32
On the same day, many legal scholars, including the author, signed a
public letter calling on the Speaker to form the Arrangements Committee
immediately.33 The letter’s signatories expressed concern regarding the lack
of the Knesset’s supervision over a caretaker government at a time of deep
health and economic crises, while this government exercised emergency
powers. This caretaker government even tracked civilians’ movement
through electronic collection of their phones’ location data, without civilians’
consent, to restrict the pandemic’s spread. For this the government utilized
the technological capabilities of the General Security Services (GSS),
originally developed to fend off security threats.34
Additionally, the 61 Bloc requested Edelstein to include in the Knesset’s
agenda a proposal to elect a permanent Knesset Speaker for the Twenty-Third
Knesset.35 Edelstein refused, claiming that this hasty move would undermine
the possibility of forming a much-needed unity government.36 On March 19,
in response to Edelstein’s refusals to (1) form an Arrangements Committee,

29. Press Release, Knesset News, The Knesset’s Plenary Session Closed, Edelstein: There Will
Be No Escape from Bringing the Matter to a Vote in the Plenary Session (Mar. 18, 2020),
https://m.knesset.gov.il/news/pressreleases/pages/press18.03.20.aspx [hereinafter Press Release,
The Knesset’s Plenary Session Closed].
30. Knesset Law, 5754–1994, § 2a.
31. Zvi Zecharia, The Knesset’s Legal Advisor to Edelstein: There is an Urgent Need to Appoint
an
Arrangements
Committee,
CALCALIST
(Mar.
18,
2020),
https://www.calcalist.co.il/local/articles/0,7340,L-3802050,00.html.
32. Bar-Siman-Tov, supra note 10, at 30–33, 39.
33. An Open Letter to the Speaker and the Knesset’s Legal Advisor, VERFASSUNGSBLOG (Mar.
19, 2020), https://verfassungsblog.de/an-open-letter-to-the-speaker-and-the-legal-advisor-of-theknesset/.
34. HCJ 2109/20 Ben Meir v. Prime Minister, ¶ 1 Nevo Legal Database (April 26, 2020); see
also Rivka Weill, Unique Dimensions of Israel’s Struggle with Covid 19, YOUTUBE (Feb. 22, 2020),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I2OFfp6_h_c.
35. Edelstein Decision, supra note 1, at ¶ 1–2 (President Hayut).
36. Id.
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and (2) hold a vote on appointing a permanent Knesset Speaker, public
petitioners (including political parties) approached the Court.37 They claimed
that Edelstein’s refusal constituted a grave violation of the parliamentary
fabric of life, justifying judicial intervention.
The Court held that because a majority wanted to replace the Speaker,
the Speaker must allow for such a vote to reflect election results. MKs’ right
to elect a Speaker warrants special protection during the COVID-19 crisis,
which involved the exertion of emergency powers that greatly infringed upon
constitutional rights.38 A further justification was Edelstein’s carryover
position as a stand-in for a caretaker government whose tenure carried
through a third election cycle.39 The Court cited my work for the proposition
that a caretaker government suffers from a democratic deficit, and this is
especially true after elections, when the people’s will has already been
expressed. Thus, there is a greater need for parliamentary supervision of the
caretaker government’s actions.40
People unfamiliar with current Israeli politics might have trouble
comprehending this constitutional crisis’s magnitude. The Court used a
neutral tone that failed to capture Israel’s state of polarization. The Court
failed to mention that the decision was given at a time in which Prime
Minister (“PM”) Benjamin Netanyahu, who headed the caretaker
government, was Israel’s first indicted sitting PM. It also did not note that
multiple petitioners petitioned the Court several times against an indicted
PM’s continued tenure.41 Nor did it note that Speaker Edelstein belonged to
Netanyahu’s party.
The Court noted that Edelstein feared that the new emerging Knesset
majority sought to elect a permanent Speaker to pass “controversial
legislation,”42 but did not elaborate on this legislation’s nature and why
petitioners were intent on passing it as soon as possible. In fact, this
“controversial legislation” sought to amend Israel’s Basic Laws to prevent a
criminally indicted person from forming and heading a government.43
Israel is a constitutional democracy. The Knesset enacts and amends
Basic Laws using its regular legislative process. Each Basic Law deals with
a particular state institution or constitutional rights and principles. Despite
their processes’ enactment, the Court treats the Basic Laws as Israel’s
37. Id. ¶ 1 (Amit Justice), ¶ 8 (Deputy President Melcer).
38. Id. ¶ 9 (President Hayut).
39. Id. ¶ 9, 11 (President Hayut), ¶ 6 (Amit Justice), ¶ 3–5 (Deputy President Melcer).
40. Id. ¶ 4–5 (Deputy President Melcer).
41. Rivka Weill, Is the Judicial Impeachment of the Israeli Prime Minister Constitutional?, 21
LAW & GOV. 49, 50–51 (2020) (Isr.).
42. Edelstein Decision, supra note 1, at ¶ 2 (President Hayut).
43. See Rivka Weill, The Rule of Law Protects Benjamin Netanyahu, HAARETZ (Mar. 8, 2020),
https://www.haaretz.co.il/opinions/.premium-1.8639819.
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supreme formal constitution and exercises judicial review to enforce their
superiority over regular legislation.44 The petitioners’ aimed to amend
Israel’s constitution to prevent an indicted political rival from forming a
government.
II. THE FORMATION OF THE ARRANGEMENTS COMMITTEE
Under the Knesset Law, the Knesset shall promptly elect an
Arrangements Committee,45 headed by an MK from the faction tasked with
forming a government.46 The Committee’s composition shall correspond to
the Knesset factions’ relative size.47 The Arrangements Committee shall
bring to the Knesset’s approval a proposal regarding the standing
committees’ composition. Until the Knesset Committee’s election, the
Arrangements Committee enjoys the power to decide on matters concerning
the Knesset’s rules and deliberations.48
In the plenary session, Edelstein explained that the Knesset’s practice
requires the Arrangements Committee to form with consensus. Yet, barring
agreement, he committed to enable a vote. He subsequently postponed any
discussion on the matter for a week.49 On the same day, the Knesset’s Legal
Advisor, Eyal Yinon, sent Edelstein a legal opinion stating:
[T]he practice of subjecting only one agreed-upon committee
composition option to the Knesset plenum, worthy as the makeup
may be, cannot override the explicit provision of the law, which
requires forming the Arrangements Committee “as soon as
possible” . . . this is especially so in these critical times, when
Israel is in the midst of an unprecedented health crisis . . . the most
important democratic institution in our country, the Knesset, is
effectively incapacitated.50
In the petition’s shadow, Edelstein allowed the Arrangements
Committee to form, unfreezing the Knesset’s activity.51 Edelstein could not
afford to further wait because of a pending injunction against the government
and Knesset. A few days prior, in a different petition, the Court made the
44. On Israel’s unique constitutional development, see Rivka Weill, Hybrid Constitutionalism:
The Israeli Case for Judicial Review and Why We Should Care, 30 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 349
(2012).
45. The Knesset Law, 5754–1994, § 2a(a).
46. Id.
47. Id. §2 a(b).
48. Id. §2 a(c) & (d).
49. Press Release, The Knesset’s Plenary Session Closed, supra note 29.
50. Binyanim Berger, The Knesset’s Legal Advisor: There is a Duty to Establish the
Arrangements Committee by the Beginning of Next Week, JDN (Mar. 18, 2020),
https://www.jdn.co.il/news/1298918/.
51. Edelstein Decision, supra note 1, at ¶ 1 (President Hayut).
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Knesset’s supervision a precondition for the GSS’s continued deployment to
track COVID-19 patients through their phones.52
On March 23, the plenum approved the Arrangements Committee’s
composition by a majority of 61 MKs. The members of the 58 Bloc
boycotted the discussion and the vote, while Edelstein abstained.53 He
explained via media that the Knesset never ceased to function and that a
petition was not needed to instigate parliamentary activity.54
The causal link between the petitions and the Arrangements
Committee’s formation is debatable. It is impossible to prove that Edelstein
had relented solely because of the petition and would not have done so
otherwise. Yet, ignoring the sequence of events is difficult. The fact that
petitioners may challenge parliamentary procedures is extremely important,
though this power is uncommon in comparative law.55 The threat of petitions
and their political price may have spurred the Knesset Speaker to act as
expected, even without actual judicial intervention.
Did Edelstein abuse his power? My historical analysis of the Knesset’s
protocols reveals that, as of the Second Knesset (in the First Knesset there
was only a standing committee) and until the Twenty-Third Knesset, every
Arrangements Committee was appointed with all parties’ agreement, in the
first or second sitting of the Knesset.56 Thus, the Twenty-Third Knesset’s
partisan appointment of an Arrangements Committee was unprecedented.
Edelstein knew this, reasoning, “I do not have a choice but to create a
precedent.”57
If not for the extraordinary circumstances—a caretaker government that
has remained in power for over a year and employed extensive emergency
powers—it would have been appropriate to delay the Arrangements
Committee’s formation by a few days to ensure broad multi-party consent.
Moreover, the Arrangements Committee brings the standing committees’
composition to the Knesset’s approval, and dissolves upon their formation.58
Yet their composition may be later changed.
Thus, the partisan
52. HCJ 2109/20 Ben Meir v. Prime Minister, ¶ 4 Nevo Legal Database (Mar. 19, 2020) (an
interlocutory injunction decision).
53. 23rd Knesset’s Protocol, Sitting No. 4, at 37 (Mar. 23, 2020),
https://main.knesset.gov.il/Activity/plenum/Pages/Sessions.aspx; Press Release, Knesset News,
The Plenary Session Approved the Establishment of the Arrangements Committee (Mar. 23, 2020,
7:45 PM), https://m.knesset.gov.il/news/pressreleases/pages/press23.03.20.aspx.
54. Wrong and Deceitful Hearsay: Yuli Edelstein Responds to Criticism, KIPPA NEWS (Mar 19,
2020).
55. See generally Stephen Gardbaum, Comparative Political Process Theory,
18 INT’L J. CONST. L. 1429 (2020); Suzie Navot, Judicial Review of the Legislative Process, 39 ISR.
L. REV. 182 (2006).
56. See Weill, supra note 20, at 340–41.
57. Wrong and Deceitful Hearsay, supra note 54.
58. See supra notes 45–48 and accompanying text.
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appointment’s effects were reversible. This, in turn, justified the public
demand for the Speaker’s swift action.
III. THE REVOLUTIONARY JUDICIAL INTERVENTION
The petitioners’ strategic grouping of the Arrangements Committee’s
formation and the permanent Speaker’s election was beneficial. The Court
concluded that the Knesset needed a permanent Speaker to function. Justice
Amit determined that “a Government that has not yet formed cannot control
the Knesset and order it to ‘cool its engines’ until it is formed, if at all.”59
While forming an Arrangements Committee is critical to jumpstart the
Knesset’s regular activity, the Knesset can temporarily function even with an
interim Speaker.
The petitioners claimed that Edelstein’s refusal to hold an immediate
vote to elect a Speaker violated separation of powers because it frustrated
majority will. They argued that Edelstein was motivated by personal interest
to maintain his position. Thus, his exercise of discretion was unlawful.60
Edelstein responded that he may legally postpone the vote until a new
government is formed.61 He relied on the Knesset’s past behavior. He
explained that parliamentary systems avoid appointing a hostile, noncoalition Knesset Speaker.62 The Knesset’s Legal Advisor conceded the
latter point and advised the Court to wait.63
Edelstein seemed to have strong arguments backing his stance,
including the Knesset’s Rules of Procedure, the constitutional practice, and
judicial precedents. The Knesset’s Rules of Procedure state: “The Speaker
shall be elected no later than the date on which the Knesset convened for the
purpose of establishing the Government.”64 They explicitly authorized the
Speaker to schedule the vote within the time frame between the Knesset’s
swearing-in and the government’s inauguration.
My examination of all appointments of a Speaker from the First Knesset
until the Edelstein decision reveals that constitutional practice supported
Edelstein’s position. Until 1977, the year in which the first political transition
of power occurred,65 the Knesset Speaker’s election and the Knesset’s
59. Edelstein Decision, supra note 1, at ¶ 4 (Amit, J.).
60. Id. ¶ 4 (President Hayut).
61. Id. ¶ 5 (President Hayut).
62. The Knesset Speaker’s Submission to the Court on March 23, 2020 (on file with the author).
63. Edelstein Decision, supra note 1, at ¶ 6 (President Hayut).
64. KNESSET R.P. 2(b).
65. Rivka Weill, Reconciling Parliamentary Sovereignty and Judicial Review: On the
Theoretical and Historical Origins of the Israeli Legislative Override Power, 39 HASTINGS CONST.
L. Q. 457, 463 (2012); ERAN ELDAR, THE ROAD TO ‘77: THE COLLAPSE OF THE HEGEMONY OF
THE LABOR PARTY, 1965–1977, at 14, 18 (2018).
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swearing-in always aligned.66 In six out of eight Knesset terms, there was
only one candidate, and he won broad multi-party support.67 In the Seventh
Knesset, two MKs contended for the role for the first time. One garnered
wide support and the other only two votes.68 In the Eighth Knesset, the
Speaker won by a 3:2 margin.69
Between 1977 and 1996—when political power alternated between the
two major political parties or when unity governments formed—at least two
MKs contended for the role, but the gap in their support levels remained
substantial.70 Until the Edelstein decision, the closest vote on the Speaker
occurred during the Tenth Knesset. The elected Speaker technically won by
only five votes, but another party (Tehiya) abstained while voicing its support
for the winner. Thus, the real gap between the contenders was eight votes.
In this Knesset, MKs requested to hold this vote via a secret ballot but were
denied.71 Following this close election, in the next Knesset, the Speaker’s
election was moved closer to the government’s establishment.72
Since 1996 and until the Edelstein ruling, there was only one de facto
candidate each time and the vote occurred circa the government’s
establishment. Most years, there was only one candidate to begin with,
except in 1996 and 1999 when Arab MKs nominated themselves on
principle,73 stating that it is important to demonstrate that Arab MKs can also
serve as Knesset Speakers.74 The primary opposition party did not nominate
candidates during the entire era.75 In 2015, interim Speaker Amir Peretz
scheduled the vote in which Yuli Edelstein ascended to Speakership to
coincide with the Knesset’s swearing-in. Peretz said, “in many of the Knesset
terms the permanent Speaker is elected only after a month, until the
government’s establishment . . . [in this case] it is absolutely obvious that
[Edelstein] will indeed serve as Speaker at one point or another.”76 The fact
that, after such an acknowledgement of the Knesset’s practice, Peretz’s Labor
66. Weill, supra note 20, at 343.
67. Id.
68. 7th Knesset’s Protocol, Sitting No. 1, at 8 (November 17, 1969),
https://fs.knesset.gov.il/7/Plenum/7_ptm_253115.pdf.
69. 8th Knesset’s Protocol, Sitting No. 1, at 7 (January 21, 1974),
https://fs.knesset.gov.il/8/Plenum/8_ptm_253614.pdf.
70. Weill, supra note 20, at 343–44 (with supporting charts).
71. 10th Knesset’s Protocol, Sitting No. 1, at 5-6 (July 20th, 1981),
https://fs.knesset.gov.il/10/Plenum/10_ptm_529601.PDF.
72. Weill, supra note 20, at 343–44.
73. Id. at 344–46 (with a supporting chart summarizing the data).
74. See, e.g., 14th Knesset’s Protocol, Sitting No. 3, at 26 (June 24th, 1996) (Speech of
Abdulwahab Darawshe MK), https://main.knesset.gov.il/Activity/plenum/Pages/Sessions.aspx.
75. Weill, supra note 20, at 344–46 (with a supporting chart summarizing the data).
76. 20th Knesset’s Protocol, Sitting No. 1, at 14 (March 31, 2015),
https://main.knesset.gov.il/Activity/plenum/Pages/Sessions.aspx.
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party joined the petitioners in the Edelstein case, denouncing Edelstein’s
improper conduct, is astonishing.
Edelstein’s behavior was, therefore, in accordance with the Knesset’s
practice, which has a binding status according to Basic Law: The Knesset.77
The Knesset’s practice also affects the Rules of Procedure’s interpretation.78
The practice’s rationale is that if this had been a vote for a temporary Speaker,
then a temporary Knesset majority would suffice. However, since speakers
are elected for the entire Knesset’s term, and are practically impossible to
remove, this ensures that they enjoyed the support of a stable Knesset
majority representing a government coalition.
Regarding judicial precedents, the Court’s intervention in intraparliamentary procedures is very rare. The Court has never intervened with
the Knesset’s schedule until Edelstein, even when facing a violation of the
Knesset’s Rules of Procedure and even when the government’s fate was at
stake.79 This amounted to recognition that scheduling votes is the prerogative
of the Knesset. Edelstein’s case did not even concern a violation of the
Knesset’s Rules of Procedure or a deviation from constitutional practice, thus
making the Court’s intervention extraordinary.
IV. THE EDELSTEIN RULING’S CANONIZATION
Why then did the Court intervene in the Edelstein case? The Court
seemed to justify the decision by the need to strengthen the Knesset, stating
that it is not “the Government’s cheerlead[er].”80 The Court opined that the
majority’s will to elect a permanent Speaker should not be thwarted,81
reasoning that it was “unclear” whether the vote might lead to the election of
a hostile Speaker.82 The Deputy President, Justice Hanan Melcer, even
suggested that a hostile Knesset Speaker might be desirable and strengthen
“the independence of the Knesset and the required checks and balances.”83
This legal reasoning is problematic in a parliamentary system, which
does not have separate elections for the government and legislature, because
the government is a subset of the legislature. The parliamentary system seeks
to prevent deadlocks between the legislature and executive, which sometimes
ensue in presidential systems when different parties control parliament and
77. Basic Law: The Knesset, § 19.
78. KNESSET R.P. 141–43.
79. See Weill, supra note 20, at 347–48.
80. Edelstein Decision, supra note 1, at ¶ 11 (Hayut, President) (citing HCJ 4374/15 Movement
for Quality Gov’t in Israel v. Prime Minister, Nevo Legal Database (Mar. 27, 2016)).
81. Id. ¶11 (President Hayut); Id. ¶ 3 (Amit, J.); Id. (Vogelman, J.); Id. ¶ 5 (Deputy President
Melcer).
82. Id. ¶ 13 (President Hayut).
83. Id. ¶ 12 (Melcer, Deputy President, concurring).
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the government. Therefore, only a parliamentary system authorizes the
legislature to dissolve a government which loses majority support through a
non-confidence motion,84 including failure to pass budgetary legislation. In
a pure presidential system, the president is not ousted even if the budget does
not pass and a government shutdown occurs.85
In a parliamentary system, a government must control the legislature
vis-à-vis the Speaker to prevent a hostile Speaker from utilizing agendasetting powers to create gridlock. This reality conforms with the democratic
effort of parliamentary regimes around the world, which allows governments
to control parliamentary time allocation through the Speaker.86
Thus, even the parliamentary system’s logic supported waiting for a
government to form before electing a Knesset Speaker while it was unclear
which bloc would succeed in forming a government. The Knesset’s Speaker
enjoys broad authority to manage the Knesset’s internal affairs, and thus
determines whether the government’s agenda will succeed.87
The
government’s need to appoint the Speaker is even greater since Israel’s
constitutional system requires the Knesset’s approval, and even express
legislation, as a precondition for government activity in contentious areas
with long-term effects, especially on constitutional rights.88
The Court noted that it expects the Knesset Speaker to act in an
appropriate manner for such a public figure, and that the Speaker is forbidden
from weighing in on political considerations when determining the Knesset
assembly’s daily agenda.89 However, such ideals do not reconcile with the
prevalent, and even preferred, political reality. The legislature is the abode
of politics and its Rules of Procedure were designed in consideration of the
government’s edge over the opposition in setting the agenda.90 Accounting
for political considerations is a primary component of the Speaker’s role.
The Court’s experience with the multiple petitions against intraparliamentary procedures since the 1980s only reinforces this. Even in the
Sarid91 decision—which first established the judicial authority to intervene

84. Weill, supra note 21, at 1395–96; Weill, supra note 11, at 1097–04.
85. See Rivka Weill, Healing the Budget’s Ills or Budgeting the Healing of the Ill—Is the
Constitutional Dilemma, 6 L. & BUS. 157, 186–87 (2007) (Isr.).
86. Weill, supra note 12, at 434; Herbert Döring, Time as a Scarce Resource: Government
Control of the Agenda, in PARLIAMENTS AND MAJORITY RULE IN WESTERN EUROPE 223, 227
(Herbert Döring ed., 1995).
87. KNESSET R. P. 6(a), 25(b).
88. See Rivka Weill, Juxtaposing Constitution-Making and Constitutional Infringement
Mechanisms in Israel and Canada: On the Interplay between Common Law Override and Sunset
Override, 49 ISR. L. REV. 103, 118–19 (2016).
89. Edelstein Decision, supra note 1, at ¶ 9, 11 (President Hayut).
90. See Weill, supra note 12, at 429.
91. HCJ 652/81 Sarid v. Chairman of the Knesset, 36 P.D. 197 (1982).
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in intra-parliamentary procedures if the Court identifies a grave breach of the
parliamentary system’s most fundamental values—the Court did not
intervene. This allowed the Speaker to postpone a no-confidence vote from
11:00 AM to 5:00 PM to enable coalition MKs to return from abroad and
vote. This delay saved the government, but the petitioners criticized it as a
deviation from the Knesset’s protocol.92
The Court also declined to intervene in the Ratz Faction decision.93 In
this case, the Deputy Speaker scheduled a no-confidence motion that would
lead to the government’s fall later than mandated in the Knesset’s Rules of
Procedure. He sought to buy time for PM Yitzhak Shamir to fire his Deputy
PM, Shimon Peres—who orchestrated the no-confidence motion—before the
government’s fall.94 Peres’s infamous “dirty trick” was the only time in
Israel’s history that a government fell because of a no-confidence vote. Other
governments voluntarily dissolved to pre-empt public disgrace.95
In the Hanan Porat96 decision, the Court dodged a petition to intervene
in the Speaker’s judgement to block MK Porat’s proposal to mandate a
nation-wide referendum before proceeding to the second stage of the Oslo
Accords. The Knesset’s plenary session decided on an earlier day to hold
debate on Porat’s proposal, but the Speaker prevented it. This is but a sample
of examples proving the Court’s awareness that the Knesset Speaker’s
discretion always entails political considerations.
The only way to justify and canonize the Edelstein ruling is to pay
attention to what the Court said between the lines. The Court feared that
Edelstein, as Netanyahu’s agent, sought to prevent a proper transfer of
political power. The Court’s President, Esther Hayut, said Edelstein was
“undermin[ing] . . . the democratic process . . . [and] the status of the Knesset
as an independent [authority] and the process of governmental transition.”97
Deputy President (ret.) Hanan Melcer wrote that Edelstein’s actions

92. Id. at 197–99.
93. HCJ 1179/90 Ratz Faction v. Deputy Knesset Speaker, 44 P.D. 31 (1990).
94. Id. at 34. See generally Asher Arian, Political Parties and the Emergence of Israel’s
Second Republic, in POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE COLLAPSE OF THE OLD ORDERS 165, 170–72
(John Kenneth White & Philip John Davies eds. 1998).
95. Rivka Weill, Twilight Time: On the Authority of Caretaker Governments, 13 L. & GOV’T.
167, 213 (2010) (Isr.). It should be noted that the unity government, which was headed by
Netanyahu and Ganz, decided not to pass the budget act in 2020. Under Israeli law, and in
accordance with Israel’s parliamentary system, the failure to pass a budget act automatically
prompts elections. See supra note 84 and accompanying text. See also Steve Hendrix, Israel Staves
Off New Elections by Approving First Budget in Three Years, WASH. POST (Nov. 4, 2021, 9:46
AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/israel-budget-electionsbennett/2021/11/04/0c63d6b4-3d48-11ec-bd6f-da376f47304e_story.html.
96. HCJ 4064/95 Porat v. Knesset Speaker, 49 P.D. 177, 177–79 (1995).
97. Edelstein Decision, supra note 1, at ¶ 15 (President Hayut) (emphasis added) (quote
translated from the original in Hebrew).
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“violate[] the tradition of a proper transfer of governance.”98 This rationale
aligns with John Hart Ely’s political process theory that justifies judicial
review to remedy failures of democracy in order to, inter alia, enable smooth
transfer of power following elections.99
The Court’s fear aligned with the charged atmosphere in the public
arena. As this drama unfolded, the “Black Flags” protest movement
endeavored to oust Netanyahu for his alleged corruption, arguing that his
continued rule amounts to raising a black flag over Israel’s democracy.100
Demonstrators further claimed that Edelstein forcibly refused, in a nondemocratic fashion, to vacate his office in defiance of election results.101 In
an op-ed, the philosopher Yuval Noah Harari characterized Edelstein’s
refusal as a coup.102 The Court acted swiftly to prevent a scenario like the
assault on the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021. Perhaps this is why Professor
Daniel Friedman, a former Minister of Justice and a great opponent of
judicial intervention in parliamentary affairs, stated: “We should welcome
this [Edelstein] decision, which is sharp, practical, to the point, and no less
important—was decided as quickly as needed.”103
V. SUBSEQUENT CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUE
Defying the Court’s order, Edelstein did not include the Knesset
Speaker’s election in the agenda.104 On March 25, 2020, at 11:00 AM,
Edelstein declared on the Knesset’s floor that the Court’s decision constitutes
an unprecedented undermining of Israel’s democratic foundations. In his
words:
The Supreme Court ruling is not based on the letter of the law, but
on a one-sided and extreme interpretation. . . . The Court ruling
constitutes a crude and arrogant intervention of the judiciary in the
matters of the elected legislature. The Court decision causes
unprecedented harm to the People’s and the Knesset’s sovereignty.
The Court decision undermines the foundations of Israeli
98. Id. ¶ 9 (Deputy President Melcer).
99. See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW (1980).
100. Idan Zonshine, Black Flags Movement Disbands After over a Year: “Mission
Accomplished’, JERUSALEM POST (June 25, 2021, 11:29 AM), https://www.jpost.com/israelnews/black-flags-movement-disbands-after-over-a-year-mission-accomplished-672012.
101. Jushua (Josh) Brainer, A Convoy of Hundreds of Cars Demonstrates in Jerusalem over the
Weakening of the Knesset in the Shadow of the Corona, HAARETZ (Mar. 23, 2020),
https://www.haaretz.co.il/news/politi/1.8701561.
102. Yuval Noah Harari, Yes, This is What a Coup Attempt Looks Like, YNET (Mar. 22, 2020,
10:35 AM), https://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-5699445,00.html.
103. Daniel Friedman, This Time, the High Court of Justice’s Intervention is Justified and
Warranted, YNET (Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-5700619,00.html.
104. Contempt Decision, supra note 8, at ¶ 2.
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democracy. . . . And, therefore, as a democrat, as a Zionist Jew, as
someone who has fought against dark regimes [in the Soviet
Union], and as the Speaker of this house, I will not allow Israel to
descend into anarchy. I will not lend a hand to civil war. I will act
in the spirit of Menachem Begin, who, in June 1948, in the days of
the Altalena Affair, prevented civil war.105
Edelstein announced his resignation as Speaker because he could not
conscientiously comply with the decision. Since the Knesset Speaker’s
resignation comes into effect only after forty-eight hours, Edelstein violated
the Court’s decision.106
If not for the pressing timetable, a resignation would have been the most
appropriate step for public officials who feel that their conscience does not
enable them to uphold a Court order. By resigning, they enable their
successor to fulfill the Court’s order, as the order concerns the function of a
titular office, not the personal identity of the civil servant currently occupying
it.
A storm followed. One hundred and sixteen retired judges signed on to
an unprecedented petition against this fatal attack on the rule of law.107
Professor Suzie Navot said that “we are the closest we have ever been to
anarchy,” and that this struggle centers on the Court’s need to protect the
Knesset from the government.108 Hundreds gathered outside the Knesset to
protest against this attack on democracy.109
Edelstein, however, did not retract, and maintained his claim that the
Court is the one harming democracy. He, in contrast, fulfilled his public duty
and paid for following his conscience. Edelstein asserted that he prevented
a modern iteration of the Altalena Affair, which occurred in June 1948 and
involved a military confrontation between the IDF and the Jewish National
Military Organization over the control of weapons and ammunition shipped
by the latter to Israel.110 MK Yariv Levine—then Minister of Tourism who
eventually ascended to Speakership—criticized the Court, saying:

105. 23rd
Knesset’s
Protocol,
Sitting
No.
6,
at
3–4
(Mar.
25,
2020), https://main.knesset.gov.il/Activity/plenum/Pages/Sessions.aspx.
106. KNESSET R.P. 5(a)(2).
107. Tova Zimoki, 116 Retired Judges Against Edelstein: An Undermining of the HCJ–The
Destruction of Democracy, YNET (Mar. 25, 2020), https://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L5701545,00.html
108. Suzie Navot, We Are the Nearest to Anarchy That We Have Ever Been, 103FM (Mar. 26,
2020), https://103fm.maariv.co.il/programs/media.aspx?ZrqvnVq=HLMMKJ&c41t4nzVQ=FJI.
109. Hundreds Protest Against Edelstein, Government Outside the Knesset, TIMES ISRAEL (Mar.
25, 2020, 12:36 PM), https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/hundreds-protest-againstedelstein-government-outside-the-knesset/.
110. Yehuda Lapidot, The Irgun: The Altalena Affair, JEWISH VIRTUAL LIBR. (June 20, 1948),
https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/the-altalena-affair.
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“[I]f President Esther Hayut wants to put herself above the
Knesset, she is welcome to come to the Knesset building with the
Court’s guard and open the Assembly’s session herself. That way,
it will be clear that this amounts to a coup carried by a bare handful
of Justices who appoint themselves in the secrecy of private
rooms.”111
Following Edelstein’s resignation as Speaker, the petitioners requested
to hold Edelstein in contempt of Court.112 The petitioners also asked for a
declaratory judgment that would state that Edelstein’s tenure was effectively
terminated. Therefore, the regulations that mandate that the Knesset
Speaker’s resignation comes into effect after forty-eight hours would not
apply. They requested the Court to set a procedure for the immediate election
of a new Speaker.113
President Hayut ruled that, although the Court has seen cases in which
the political branches “dragged their feet” to postpone compliance with Court
injunctions, “never in the history of the State has any governmental office
openly and defiantly refused to carry out a judicial order while declaring that
his conscience does not allow him to comply with the judgment.”114 In doing
so, the President declared that Edelstein gravely injured the public interest of
ensuring that the rule of law perseveres. She said, “[i]f that is how a person
of authority behaves, why should a common citizen act differently?”115
Because the Court opined that there was a lacuna in existing law to solve the
drama, it decided to follow the advice of the Knesset’s Legal Advisor. The
Court decreed that the most senior MK would reconvene the plenum the next
day to hold a vote on replacing the Speaker, although it was not a day in
which the Knesset usually convenes. The Court opined that, this way, the
judicial order from March 23, 2020, would be upheld.116 The Court declared
that, because this was an unprecedented case, it required “unprecedented
remedies.”117
Because Edelstein resigned on Wednesday at 11:00 AM, his resignation
would not have taken effect until Friday, a day in which the Knesset does not
convene. It seems that this was Edelstein’s way to stall and allow the behind-

111. Tal Schnieder, Senior Ministers to the Knesset’s Speaker Edelstein: Disobey the HCJ’s
Rule, GLOBES (Mar. 23, 2020), https://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1001322995.
112. Contempt Decision, supra note 8, at ¶ 3.
113. Id.
114. Id. ¶ 4.
115. Id.
116. Id. ¶ 5–6.
117. Id.
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the-scenes negotiations between the Likud and Ganz to continue.118 If not
for Edelstein’s maneuver, MK Meir Cohen from the Yesh Atid party of the
61 Bloc would have been elected Knesset Speaker. Since a Knesset Speaker
can only be removed for the cause of unbefitting conduct and such a removal
requires the support of at least ninety out of out of one hundred and twenty
MKs, appointing Cohen would have made it almost impossible to form a
unity government; it would have been an irreversible act.119
In the mere hours that had passed between Edelstein’s resignation and
the time in which MK Amir Peretz—as the most senior MK—held a vote for
electing a permanent Knesset Speaker, the unity government took shape.
After campaigning under the slogan “Blue and White or Erdoğan [suggesting
Netanyahu was like the Turkish President]”120 and despite promising voters
that he would not cooperate with Netanyhu,121 Ganz was elected Knesset
Speaker with the Likud’s support.122 His former running mates, including
the Yesh Atid party, opposed this move.123 Ganz joined Netanhayu’s unity
government and the Blue and White party disbanded.124 Ultimately, Ganz
became Speaker, supported by seventy-four MKs, with eighteen opposed.125
For the first time, the Court dictated the Knesset Speaker’s election date. This
was also the first time that an Israeli Speaker has been elected in a roll call
vote.126

118. Yehuda Shlezinger, Towards Unity: Behind the Scenes, ISR. TODAY (Mar. 26, 2020),
https://newsrnd.com/news/2020-03-26--towards-unity--behind-the-scenes-%7C--israeltoday.S1wUrj9LU.html.
119. Knesset Law, 5754–1994, § 8(a).
120. Eric Bender, Ganz: “Netanyahu Has No Boundaries, It’s Either Blue and White or Erdoğan
Entrenched,” MAARIV (Feb. 24, 2020, 11:40 AM), https://www.maariv.co.il/breakingnews/Article-750072.
121. Yisrael Ohayon, Ganz in a series of interviews: “[W]e will not sit in unity with bibi – we
have understandings on religious issues with Yisrael Beiteinu,” Actualic-Election (Feb. 15, 2020,
8:34
PM),
https://actualic.co.il/%d7%92%d7%a0%d7%a5%d7%91%d7%a1%d7%93%d7%a8%d7%aa%d7%a8%d7%90%d7%99%d7%95%d7%a0%d7%95%d7%aa-%d7%9c%d7%90%d7%a0%d7%a9%d7%91-%d7%91%d7%90%d7%97%d7%93%d7%95%d7%aa%d7%a2%d7%9d-%d7%91%d7%99%d7%91/.
122. Oliver Holmes, Benny Gantz Elected Israeli Speaker, Signalling Deal with Netanyahu,
GUARDIAN (Mar. 26, 2020, 2:01 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/26/bennygantz-elected-israeli-speaker-signalling-deal-with-netanyahu.
123. Id.
124. Jonathan Lis & Chaim Levinson, Blue and White Dismantled: Ganz Will Join a
Government
Headed
by
Netanyahu,
HAARETZ
(Mar.
26,
2020),
https://www.haaretz.co.il/news/politi/.premium-1.8712453.
125. 23rd Knesset’s Protocol, Sitting No. 7, at 25 (March 26, 2020),
https://main.knesset.gov.il/Activity/plenum/Pages/Sessions.aspx.
126. Weill, supra note 20, at 355.
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VI. THE LIMITS OF JUDICIAL INTERVENTION IN PARLIAMENTARY AFFAIRS
The Edelstein decision manifests all the perils of judicial intervention in
intra-parliamentary procedures. The decision involves both politicization of
the judiciary and judicialization of politics. Judicial politicization risks
undermining the Court’s legitimacy because intervention in blatantly
political matters might paint the Court as partisan.127 Judicialization of
politics might weaken political institutions since judicial intervention in
political procedures might prevent institutions from fully realizing the
political process.128
The Edelstein ruling entailed politicization of the judiciary because the
petitioners from the Blue and White party’s Bloc wanted to use the Court to
alter the political reality. They enjoyed majority support to appoint a Speaker
but not to form a government. Some members of this Bloc did not agree to
sit in a government with members of the Arab Joint List party and vice
versa.129
They sought to overtake political power in two stages: first, seize control
of the legislature, and later, through legislation, create the conditions to form
a government. Once they controlled the Speakership, the petitioners planned
to pass “controversial legislation,” in the Justices’ words.130 Those are code
words for preventing Netanyahu—Israel’s longest serving PM131—from
serving by amending Basic Law: The Government to forbid an indicted MK
from serving as PM.132 This constitutional amendment would have negated
the rule of law principle because the purpose and effect of passing the
amendment was influencing a particular person’s political fate. It would have
amounted to retroactive personal enactment while law should be general and
typically prospective in nature.133
The petitioners hoped that ousting Netanyahu would create the political
conditions necessary for realignment of political power, which would enable
a majority to form a government.134 Alternately, if no MK successfully forms
127. Alfred Witkon, Justiciability, 1 ISR. L. REV. 40, 43–44 (1966).
128. James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7
HARV L. REV. 129, 142 n.1 (1893).
129. Lahav Harkov, Hauser and Hendel: The Matchmakers Behind the Netanyahu-Gantz Unity
Deal, JERUSALEM POST (April 24, 2020, 9:21 AM), https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/politicalaffairs-the-matchmakers-behind-netanyahu-gantzs-unity-deal-625738. ’
130. Edelstein Decision, supra note 1, at ¶ 2 (Hayut, President).
131. Oliver Holmes, Benjamin Netanyahu Becomes Longest-serving Israeli PM, GUARDIAN
(July 20, 2019, 2:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jul/20/benjamin-netanyahubecomes-longest-serving-israeli-pm.
132. See Rivka Weill, Personal Legislation: The Knights of the Rule of Law Against the Rule of
Law, HAARETZ (Mar. 8, 2020), https://www.haaretz.co.il/opinions/.premium-1.8639819.
133. Id.
134. Id.; Weill, supra note 20, at 356.
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a government, Basic Law: The Government provides for holding new
elections135—this time, sans Netanyahu. Thus, rather than using the Court to
prevent the Speaker from blocking a proper transfer of power, the petitioners
wanted to use the Court to create a situation in which the transfer of political
power was a realistic possibility.
The Edelstein ruling also involved judicialization of politics, placing the
political players with their backs to the wall. It inadvertently contributed to
the fact that the winners in Court, especially the Yesh Atid party, lost in the
political arena. Had Ganz, who was initially entrusted with composing a
government,136 been given more political time, he might have succeeded in
forming a narrow majority government with his original allies. The Court’s
deadline forced Ganz to choose within an extremely narrow timetable
whether he sticks with his allies or defects to the Likud party’s Bloc. The
Likud posed an ultimatum that Ganz must present his candidacy for the
Speakership or lose the opportunity to co-form a unity government.137
The Court’s ruling arguably helped Ganz. As a Speaker, he enjoyed a
better bargaining chip for negotiations with the Likud over forming a unity
government. Ganz could not be compelled to resign as Speaker, absent a
super-majority of MKs and for cause. The Likud thus depended on Ganz’s
good will to resign and allow for the election of a coalition-approved
Speaker.
However, this bargaining chip came at the price of an irreversible
decision: Ganz needed to dissolve his party, a decision that was, to a great
extent, dictated by the Court’s intervention. The 61 Bloc’s transition from
victory in Edelstein to disintegration within days was unexpected by the
petitioners (except by Ganz and his closest allies), the Court, or the public.
The petitioners believed their legal victory secured majority support for their
intended Speaker—Meir Cohen. The 61 Bloc treated Ganz’s actions as “a
betrayal to voters and a theft of votes.”138
It is ironic that, in Edelstein, the petitioners demanded the Court’s
intervention in parliamentary affairs to protect majority rule while their
political motive was preventing Netanyahu from forming a government. Yet,
within a month, with Edelstein as precedent, and based on the same principle
of majority rule, the Court ruled that Netanyahu could legally be tasked with
forming the government although he was indicted on serious criminal charges

135. Basic Law: The Government, § 11.
136. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
137. Isabel Kershner & David M. Halbfinger, Benny Gantz, Breaking Vows, Says He Would
Serve
Under
Netanyahu,
N.Y.
Times
(Mar.
26,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/26/world/middleeast/israel-netanyahu-gantz-government.html.
138. Moran Azulay, Lapid: Gantz Stole Votes, Gave Them to Netanyahu, YNET NEWS (Mar. 26,
2020), https://www.ynetnews.com/article/rylCEdcLL.
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concerning bribery, fraud, and breach of trust. The Court held that it cannot
overrule the popular will absent a criminal conviction.139 Thus the
petitioners’ victory in Edelstein set the stage for their defeat in the Netanyahu
ruling.
I would like to suggest that these dynamics might have played out
differently had the Court settled for declaratory relief in Edelstein. Although
President Hayut declared that there has never been a precedent for open
defiance of a judicial order by a public figure, Israel’s history proves
otherwise. In 1985, the Speaker, Shlomo Hillel, decided not to approve MK
Meir Kahane’s private bill proposals because they were racist.140 Meir
Kahane’s petition against the Speaker’s stance marked the Israeli Court’s first
intervention in intra-parliamentary procedures.
In a unanimous verdict, written by Justice Barak, the Court asserted that
Speaker Hillel’s decision to block Kahane from submitting private bills
gravely violated the parliamentary system’s most fundamental values,
preventing Kahane from fulfilling his duty as an elected representative.141
Speaker Hillel chose to defy the Court’s order, believing that his stand better
protects core democratic values. MK Kahane proposed a no-confidence vote,
prompted by the Knesset’s contempt of the judicial order.142 The Knesset did
not waver, but rather amended the Rules of Procedure to forbid the Knesset
Presidium from approving private members’ bills that were inter alia
racist.143 The amendment was also applied retroactively to include Meir
Kahane’s pending bill proposals.144
Kahane petitioned the Court to hold the Knesset’s Speaker in contempt
of the Court.145 However, the Court dismissed his petition.146 Justice Barak
explained that, in the original petition, Kahane requested an injunction, but
the Court only gave a declaratory decree, which “did not correspond to the
petition.”147 The Court stated that “regarding the duty to act in accordance
with the law . . . there is no difference between a decree that is completely
declaratory and a decree that has an operational element.”148 Nonetheless,

139. HCJ 2592/20 Movement for Quality Gov’t v. Attorney General, Nevo Legal Database (May
6, 2020).
140. HCJ 742/84 Kahane v Knesset Speaker, 39 P.D. 85 (1985).
141. Id. at 94–96.
142. 11th Knesset’s Protocol, Sitting No. 136, at 406 (Nov. 12, 1985),
https://fs.knesset.gov.il/11/Plenum/11_ptm_530511.PDF.
143. Knesset R.P. 75(e).
144. 11th Knesset’s Protocol, Sitting No. 137, at 434 (Nov. 13, 1985),
https://fs.knesset.gov.il/11/Plenum/11_ptm_530513.PDF.
145. HCJ 306/85 Kahane v. Knesset Speaker, 39 P.D. 485, 487–88 (1985).
146. Id. at 488.
147. Id. at 487.
148. Id.
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the distinction between the decrees was important in the sense that “one can
characterize someone’s actions as unlawful [for failing to follow a
declaratory judgment], but not hold him responsible for contempt of the
Court.”149
As I elaborated elsewhere, Justice Barak was highly strategic.150 He did
not hesitate to create a precedent in establishing judicial authority to
intervene in intra-parliamentary procedures but was very careful in the choice
of relief. He anticipated that the Knesset might disobey a judicial order and
prevented a head-on collision between the Knesset and the Court by granting
declaratory relief alone. The Court intentionally averted a tempest à la
Edelstein.
Moreover, strategic considerations are not the sole reason for issuing a
mere declaratory judgment when intervening in intra-parliamentary
procedures. I argue that the Court’s toolbox for these cases does not include
injunctions because of the need to protect MPs’ parliamentary privilege. This
privilege includes “the right of each House to control its own proceedings
and precincts, and the right of those participating in parliamentary
proceedings . . . to speak freely without fear of legal liability or other
reprisal.”151
This privilege is intended to protect the independence of the legislative
branch and its members. In fact, when the petitioners asked to hold Edelstein
responsible for contempt of the Court, President Hayut replied that MK
Edelstein’s substantive immunity is still in force.152 Justice Amit added that
digging into the Speaker’s property to impose fines would be
“inappropriate.”153
Under Israeli law, “MKs shall . . . be immune from exposure to any
legal action, due to a parliamentary vote, or for expressing an oral or written
opinion . . . if []done in the fulfillment of their duties.”154 Supposedly, one
could argue that, if the Court finds that MPs have exercised discretion
unlawfully, then their actions should not be characterized as conducted for
“fulfillment of their duties.”155 Thus, they supposedly should not enjoy
149. Id. at 488.
150. See generally Rivka Weill, The Strategic Common Law Court of Aharon Barak and its
Aftermath: On Judicially-led Constitutional Revolutions and Democratic Backsliding, 14 L. &
ETHICS HUM. RTS. 227 (2020).
151. JOINT COMMITTEE ON PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGE, PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGE 3
(2013), https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt201314/jtselect/jtprivi/30/30.pdf.
152. Protocol in HCJ 2144/20 Movement for Quality Gov’t in Israel v. Knesset Speaker,
Calcalist (Mar. 25, 2020), https://z.calcalist.co.il/assets/pickerul/3b63da10-a269-4443-81e3f0ab25c349de.docx.
153. Id. at 20.
154. Knesset Members’ Immunity, Rights and Duties Law, 5711–1951, § 1 (a).
155. Id.
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parliamentary privilege. However, this position is problematic because it
transforms parliamentary privilege into a principle whose content is subject
to what an external institution—the Court—decides to define as legitimate
work of MPs within parliament. Such an approach would devoid
parliamentary privilege of meaning.
The Edelstein decision differs from any precedent in which MKs were
exposed to legal sanction because, for the first time, MKs’ exposure to
criminal charges stemmed solely from disobeying another branch’s order on
how to exercise parliamentary discretion. This is different from cases in
which an MK violated a separate, independent criminal prohibition like
fraud, bribery or breach of trust. If any other governmental branch, Court
included, can instruct an MK—let alone the Knesset Speaker—on how to
exercise parliamentary discretion and enforce these orders through contempt
of court, then Parliament loses its independence.
While critics may argue that declaratory relief is powerless, its
advantage lies in its relative weakness. Declaratory relief states what the
Court’s interpretation of the law is and directs public personas to act
appropriately without forcing political actors to translate a judicial decision
into time-bound action.156 Rather than usurping the legislature’s role by
using an injunction, issuing declaratory relief transforms the Court into a
supporting actor. It contributes to a political dynamic that seeks to carry out
the Court’s declaration while accounting for the legislature’s independence.
EPILOGUE
The study of the Edelstein decision is an interesting exercise in
comparative constitutional law. Reading the judicial decision without its
broader political and legal contexts would lead to a misunderstanding of its
precedential nature. The Court failed to state that the Speaker’s election was
practically irrevocable absent a general election. Yet, without understanding
this feature of Israeli law, one cannot understand why the decision is so
difficult to justify. The Court cannot rewrite the law that the Speaker’s
position is practically irrevocable for the duration of Parliament. So, too, it
should not be authorized to rewrite the law that the outgoing Speaker serves
until the permanent Speaker’s election.
At the same time, the Edelstein drama suggests that the 2016
amendment of Basic Law: The Knesset, which provides that the outgoing
Speaker should continue in its role on a carry-over basis, is undesirable. It
might lead the interim Speaker to abuse political power in setting the
parliamentary agenda. The previous regiment, under which the most veteran
156. See, e.g., Edwin M. Borchard, Declaratory Judgment a Needed Procedural Reform, 28
YALE L.J. 105, 149 (1918).
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MK served as an interim Speaker, is more desirable because it better
expresses the idea that the interim Speaker is only a stand-in until the election
of a permanent Speaker. The Edelstein case is thus an illustration of the fact
that constitutional design of institutions matter.
If any lesson may be drawn from the Edelstein affair, it is that the
dangers of judicial intervention in parliamentary affairs may be mitigated if
courts restrict themselves to issuance of declaratory relief alone. Courts can
aid, but not replace, representative institutions to uphold the democratic
process.

